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Previously I outlined a scheme for understanding the usefulness of computational models
(Stafford, 2009). This scheme was accompanied by two specific proposals. Firstly, that al-
though models have diverse purposes, the purposes of individual modelling efforts should be
made explicit. Secondly, that the best use of modelling is in establishing the correspondence
between model elements and empirical objects in the form of certain ‘explanatory’ relation-
ships: prediction, testing, existence proofs and proofs of sufficiency and insufficiency. The
current work concerns itself with empirical tests of these two claims. I survey highly cited
modelling papers and from an analysis of this corpus conclude that although a diverse range
of purposes are represented, neither being accompanied by an explicit statement of purpose
nor being a model of my ‘explanatory’ type are necessary for a modelling paper to become
highly cited. Neither are these factors associated with higher rates of citation. The results
are situated within a philosophy of science and it is concluded that computational modelling
in the cognitive sciences does not consist of a simple Popperian prediction-and-falsification
dynamic. Although there may be common principles underlying model construction, they are
not captured by this scheme and it is difficult to imagine how they could be captured by any
simple formula.
Introduction
We might expect computational modellers to be very con-
cerned with theory and meta-theory. For one reason, compu-
tational modelling is a relatively young branch of psychology
and neuroscience. Not only this, but it is a field in which
innovation abounds, as the rise and rise of computational
power opens up new possibilities. Historically, this kind of
tumult has been associated with discussion of the scope and
purpose of a discipline, and with discussion of the standards
of comparison that should be applied to different investiga-
tions. A second reason we might expect computational mod-
ellers to concern themselves with theory and meta-theory,
is that modelling generates no data in itself. Modellers are
forced to exist in the world of theory; to simulate the under-
lying structures responsible for the patterns in the data, to
propose different explanations for the data and to test rela-
tionships between proposed theoretical entities in our com-
putational mini-worlds.
Post-print of Stafford, T. (2010). How do we use computational
models of cognitive processes? In Connectionist Models Of Neu-
rocognition And Emergent Behavior: From Theory to Applications.
Proceedings of the 12th Neural Computation and PsychologyWork-
shop, Birkbeck, University of London, 8-10 April 2010. World Sci-
entific (pp. 326-342).
For these reasons we might expect computational mod-
ellers to resist the urge to view their work as a mere techni-
cal challenge, but remain alive to the theoretical claims that
modelling work must be situated among for it to be scien-
tifically meaningful. For the same reasons, we might expect
computational modellers to be alive to the ongoing metatheo-
retical questions that concern computational modelling: what
scientific role can modelling play, how should computational
models be evaluated and what are legitimate motivations for
instigating a computational modelling project? These kinds
of questions are the domain of the philosophy of science.
Philosophy of science has a mixed reputation among sci-
entists. It has been said that there is a remarkable disparity
between the actual conduct of science and the picture pre-
sented by mainstream philosophy of science. One reason is
the greater attention paid in philosophy of science to how sci-
ence ought to be conducted — that is, to the logical require-
ments and structure of scientific claims — rather than how it
is — in fact — conducted. The physicist Richard Feynmann
is reported to have said “Philosophy of Science is as use-
ful to scientists as ornithology is to birds". The implication
being that philosophy of science is an artificial and wholly
conceptual domain of knowledge which is irrelevant to the
way scientists conduct themselves. It would be surprising,
however, if scientists were able to “do" science with quite
the same instinct, grace and spontaneity that birds fly (even
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Feynmann).
There are at least three good reasons that philosophy of
science is not just of interest, but a necessity for scientists.
What is more, these three reasons are especially pertinent to
the field of computational modelling. Firstly, an articulation
of principles is required to support the acceptance of a new
field. In the case of computational modelling it is not the case
that everyone accepts its value as a scientific activity. For ex-
ample, neuroscientist and Nobel Laureate Francis Crick ac-
cused neural network modelling of being ‘a rather low-brow
enterprise’ (Crick, 1989) and a vent for frustrated mathe-
maticians. Segalowitz and Bernstein (Segalowitz & Bern-
stein, 1997) were clearer but equally condemnatory in their
criticism, dismissing modelling and explaining that ‘models
cannot tell us anything about the world...nor can they pro-
vide new information about brain organisation or function’.
Although these criticisms concern the historical period when
computational modelling was still struggling for acceptance
in psychology and neuroscience, it is still possible to find
similar sentiments, along the lines that modelling is an in-
dulgence or irrelevance, expressed informally today. Indeed,
the division of psychologists or neuroscientists into ‘mod-
ellers’ and ‘non-modellers’ suggests that modelling has not
been fully integrated into the wider discipline.
Secondly, philosophy of science informs debates that we
have within a field. Among modellers substantial disagree-
ments exist concerning the correct approach to modelling.
As evidence of this assertion, let me pick two discussants
from a debate that occurred on the comp-neuro mailing list
in 2008. James Bower expressed the opinion that modellers
should perhaps “give up on cerebral cortex for several hun-
dred years and all study tritonia instead” (Bower, n.d.). Al-
though he was making this suggestion to illustrate a point,
it does resonate with his apparent preference for low-level
‘computational neuroscience’ modelling. In contrast, in the
same debate, Randall O’Reilly wrote that “the hippocam-
pus is essentially a “solved problem" in terms of the gen-
eral framework for how its biological properties enable its
well-established role in memory" (O’Reilly, n.d.). Not only
should we, contra Bower, continue to study cerebral cor-
tex, but we have in fact essentially solved a major part of it!
Bower initiated the discussion on the email list to illustrate
to a group of graduate students that many fundamental is-
sues within computational neuroscience are not agreed upon.
This it illustrated admirably and the reader is encouraged to
review the discussion to enjoy wide-ranging consideration of
levels of modelling, ways of assessing the value of a model,
the value of modelling in general. All of these issues are the
business of philosophy of science and a modeller-scientist
cannot avoid having a position of them, albeit if only implic-
itly.
Thirdly, and finally, a philosophy of science is necessary
to educate the next generation of scientists. Even if we could
do science as instinctively as birds fly, we would still wish to
articulate the philosophy underlying our practice of science
so that we could best convey it to future scientists. It is per-
haps surprising, then, that of four major textbooks in com-
putational neuroscience and psychology (O’Reilly & Mu-
nakata, 2000; Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Ellis & Humphreys,
1999; Elman, 1996) very little space is devoted to the topic
of what role computational models play in science. Perhaps
the silence of the textbook authors is in recognition of the
seemingly-intractable nature of many debates in philosophy
of science, and a consequent desire to avoid unfruitful dis-
cussion. I recognise the risk that claims concerning the phi-
losophy of science may evoke counter-claims and so on ad
infinitum. In the current paper, my discussion of the purposes
of computational modelling is grounded by a survey of how
computational models are presented in the literature. In this
way I hope to combine consideration of how computational
modelling should proceed with consideration of how it does,
in fact, proceed.
Three claims about computational models
Previously, I have proposed a scheme for categorising the
purposes of computational models (Stafford, 2009). The de-
tails of this scheme are less important, for the purposes of
this paper, than three claims which I will use here to moti-
vate the current work. The first claim is that there are many
purposes for which you might build a computational model.
This is a reflection of the fact that it is difficult to elaborate a
single formula which captures what all modellers are trying
to achieve with every model. Therefore, it is likely the case
that different modellers are trying to achieve different things,
and so there must be many purposes for which computational
models are built. The second claim, which recognises the
first, is that models ought to be accompanied by some state-
ment of what the modeller hopes to achieve by that model.
If models can have many different purposes, then appropri-
ate assessment of a model will take account of those pur-
poses for which a model is designed. And this is made easier
if the model-builder reveals their purposes rather than leav-
ing them to be inferred. The third claim of Stafford (2009)
is that, although there are many purposes for model build-
ing, the best purposes are those which relate to providing
explanations. This is the claim that models that use corre-
spondences between model parts and real-world entities to
make, refine or test predictions. In this claim I am influ-
enced by Popperian philosophy of science (Popper, 1968;
Magee, 1974; Chalmers, 2006) and the auxilliary assump-
tion that modelling is a kind of theory construction. This
assumption makes natural the application of the centrality
of prediction and falsification from Popperian philosophy of
science to computational modelling.
The scheme for categorising model purposes developed
by myself (Stafford, 2009), and extended here, is shown in
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Major category Sub-categories
Exploratory Capacity
Data fitting
Biological plausibility
Reinterpretation
Problem-definition
Analysis —
Integrative —
Explanatory Prediction
Testing
Sufficiency
Existence proof
Insufficiency
Table 1
Model paper categorisation scheme
Table 1. There are four major categories of model purposes
according to this scheme. Exploratory model building in-
cludes the sub-categories capacity, which is the demonstra-
tion that a model has the capacity to perform a certain kind
of function, without reference to how that model might re-
late to psychological or neuroscientific theory. For example,
the demonstration that a Hopfield network can store patterns
would be such a demonstration of capacity. Data fitting is
the demonstration that a model can generate data which re-
sembles the data generated in psychology or neuroscience
investigation. Biological plausibility is the adjustment of an
existing model to increase the extent of its correspondence
to the biological structure it purports to model. Reinterpre-
tation is the use of suggestive results from a model to widen
the scope of plausible explanations. Problem definition is
the use of modelling to explore and more fully definite the
domain in which a psychological or neuroscientific function
is performed.
The second and third major categories are models used for
analysis (e.g. a statistical model such as a linear regression)
and modelling for integration, which is the construction of
a model which combines models from two separate domains
or levels of description.
The fourth and final category, which I claim is the one that
the most scientifically useful models belong to, is of models
with explanatory purposes. To understand my breakdown of
this category I will need to rehearse an argument made pre-
viously (Stafford, 2009), which attempts to understand ex-
planation in terms of the “modelling is just tautology" accu-
sation quoted earlier (Segalowitz & Bernstein, 1997). My
argument, briefly, was that models must, in some sense, be
only tautology but they derive their power from the corre-
spondence between the parts of the model and real-world en-
tities. All mathematical equations are tautological, but this
does not mean that computation cannot be used to reveal new
facts about the world. If you take the length of the shadow of
a tower at noon in one place, and the length of the shadow of
a tower at another place at noon you can compute the circum-
ference of the earth. The result is an inherent and necessary
result of the information you put into the computation. In
this sense it is tautological, but it would be obtuse to argue
that the computation has not revealed new information about
the world.
We can take the simple example of 1 + 2 = 3 — another
tautology — and use it to illustrate the value of modelling-
as-tautology. If the model elements on the left-hand side of
the equation (‘1 + 2’) correspond to known real-world enti-
ties then the model predicts the presence of the entities that
correspond to the right-hand side elements (‘3’). If entities
corresponding to both left- and right-hand side elements are
known that the model demonstrates that the left-hand side el-
ements are sufficient to produce those entities corresponding
to elements on the right-hand side. If, alternatively, the en-
tities known to exist are more than represented by elements
on the right-hand side (for example, not ‘3’ but ‘4’ maybe)
then the model constitutes a demonstration of insufficiency
(particularly, of those entities represented by the left-hand
side of the equation to produce those entities on the right). If
the existence of the entities corresponding to elements of the
model is in doubt, or the particular interrelation represented
by the model is in doubt, then the model can constitute a form
of existence proof that these entities can exist in the particu-
lar inter-relation captured by the model. These four types of
explanation, which correspond — I suggest — to the canon-
ical Popperian category of prediction and three examples of
what Kukla (Kukla, 1995, 2001) calls theory amplification
make up the four subcategories of my fourth class of model
purpose. Note that the categorisation of a model depends on
its relationship to wider theory, not on its internal structure.
The current work
Aims
The current work is concerned with an empirical investi-
gation of how computational modelling work is presented to
the scientific community. My hope was that a set of highly-
cited modelling papers would act as a proxy for successful
or admirable modelling work. By systematic investigation
of the properties common to this set we might get some in-
sight into the characteristics of modelling papers that are as-
sociated with success (as defined in terms of high rates of
citation). The scheme outlined above is used to categorise
the modelling papers investigated, so this investigation also
acts as a test of the adequacy of this scheme for categorising
modelling paper type.
Corpus
The papers selected for this survey were the fifty most
highly cited modelling papers from five journals, plus the
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Source Search criteria
Nature Topic=(computational) AND
Topic=(neuroscience OR psychology)
Nature Neuroscience Topic=(computational)
Neural Computation ALL
Cognitive Science Topic=(model)
Connection Science ALL
NCPW11 ALL
Table 2
Search terms used to identify modelling papers from each
source
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Figure 1. Log citations for the fifty highly cited papers in-
cluded in the survey
papers from the 11th Neural Computation and Psychology
Workshop (NCPW) held in 2008 (Mayor, Ruh, & Plunkett,
2009). The journals were selected to contain a range of pa-
pers for a specialist and generalist audience, and to capture
some difference in impact factor. The search terms used
to identify modelling papers are shown in Table 2. Non-
modelling papers identified by these searches were discarded
without replacement. Papers with less than 10 citations were
also discarded, resulting in a total number of papers included
in the survey of 173.
Figure 1 shows the log of the number of citations of the
papers initially selected for inclusion in the survey, from the
five journal sources, using the search times given in Figure 2.
As expected, journals with higher impact factors have more
highly cited papers.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
NCPW11 Conference
Connection Science
Cognitive Science
Neural Computation
Nature Neuroscience
Nature
Proportion of papers which are explict about the purpose of model building
Figure 2. Proportion of papers with an explicit statement of
purpose in the abstract, by source
Results
Is making explicit your purpose for building a model
associated with publication in quality journals and/or
higher citation counts?
To address this question each paper in the corpus was
coded as to whether it made explicit in the abstract what the
purpose of the modelling work presented was. The assump-
tion here is that, because models have diverse purposes, if it
is not said why a model is built then that model cannot easily
be assessed or used by the non-modelling community.
For the NCPW11 conference, the proportion of papers
which, in their abstracts, were explicit about the purpose
for which their model was constructed was 66%. In other
words, most, but far from all, models were explicit about
their purpose. This finding confirms an informal observation
that I made while at NCPW11. One researcher I spoke to
during NCPW11 acknowledged that this state of affairs was
sub-optimal, but expressed the opinion that it was due to the
nature of the papers at a conference. In other words, this
was provisional work. Papers accepted for publication in a
journal would have a far higher proportion of those which
were explicit about their purposes. The results of my survey,
shown for all the sources in the corpus, are shown in figure
2.
The details of these results are discussed below. Because it
seemed that in general that most, but by no means all, papers
were explicit about their modelling purpose, an additional
analysis was carried out. The mean of the citation counts
was calculated for each source, divided according to those
papers which were explicit about their purpose and those that
were not. If, on average, papers which were explicit were
more highly cited (even among this corpus of highly cited
papers) then this analysis should reveal it. The results are
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Figure 3. Mean citation count for papers with and without an
explicit statement of purpose in the abstract, by source
shown in figure 3. There is no clear superiority, in terms of
citations counts, of the ‘explicit’ papers compared with the
‘non-explicit’.
What purposes are associated with highly cited papers?
The full results of the survey with respect to the primary
purpose of the modelling paper analysed, are shown in table
3. Each paper can contribute to only one cell.
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Major category Minor category Nature Nature Neuroscience Cognitive Science Connection Science Neural Computation NCPW11 TOTAL
Exploratory Capacity 2 5 4 18 22 17 68
Data fitting 0 1 6 0 0 6 13
Biological plausibility 0 0 1 2 0 5 8
Reinterpretation 1 0 1 0 0 2 4
Problem-definition 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Analysis — 2 1 2 0 0 2 7
Integrative — 1 5 5 7 3 6 27
Explanatory Prediction 1 4 3 1 1 3 13
Testing 0 0 6 2 0 1 9
Sufficiency 2 7 3 3 0 2 17
Existence proof 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
Insufficiency 1 0 0 2 0 0 3
Table 3
Survey results, model paper types by source.
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Figure 4. Proportion of models with an ‘explanatory’ pur-
pose, by source
Note that there are over twice as many ‘exploratory’ than
‘explanatory’ papers. Of the exploratory papers the majority
are of the ‘capacity’ kind. The second largest subcategory
of the exploratory type is ‘data fitting’. These two categories
are very similar in nature, but distinguished in that ‘capac-
ity’ papers demonstrate that a model can do some abstract or
general task, whereas ‘data-fitting’ papers demonstrate that a
model produces data of the same form as some experimental
procedure.
Note also that the full range of proposed modelling pur-
poses is found by the survey. In other words, there are no
empty cells in the categorisation table (although there are
some empty cells with respect to individual sources in the
corpus).
In order to further address the question of the superiority
of explanatory modelling, compared with models built for
other purposes, the proportion of models with explanatory
purposes for each source in the corpus was calculated. The
results are shown in figure 4. It is clear that a majority of
papers, in nearly all sources, are not presented as fulfilling
explanatory purposes. Even for the single source for which
more than half of papers in the corpus were explanatory, the
proportion was not very much greater than half.
An analysis of mean citation counts for explanatory com-
pared with non-explanatory papers from each source is
shown in figure 5.
Discussion
The results covered in the previous section put us in a posi-
tion to address the claims asserted previously and discussed
at the beginning of this current paper (section ). The first
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Figure 5. Mean citation count for ‘explanatory’ and ‘non-
explanatory’ modelling papers, by source
claim is that there are many purposes for which computa-
tional models are built. The results confirm this. Across the
entire corpus examples of each purpose in the categorisation
scheme were found. Two categories were well-populated,
against previous expectations. The importance of modelling
for providing theory integration and novel frameworks (as
reflected in the ‘integration’ category), and the importance
of modelling for providing new methods/techniques (as re-
flected in the ‘capacity’ category) was unanticipated from the
perspective of my previous analysis (Stafford, 2009).
The second claim is that models ought to be accompa-
nied by an explicit statement of what the modeller hopes to
achieve by that model. These data cannot address this claim,
since it is normative by nature, but they can inform us as to
what occurs ‘in the wild’ with respect to model publishing.
Evidently, many highly cited papers are not accompanied, in
their abstracts, by an explicit statement of the purpose for
which they are built. Further, it does not seem as if mod-
els accompanied by an explicit statement of purpose have
a higher citation count among the corpus, on average (Fig-
ure 5. Although the mean citation count is higher for ‘ex-
plicit’ models for those published in Nature (see figure 3),
the opposite patten was true for models published in Neural
Computation. Furthermore, the highly skewed distribution of
citation counts (see figure 1) means that a small number of
highly cited papers have a disproportionate impact on these
mean figures, and so although the difference between the ‘ex-
plicit’ and ‘non-explicit’ means seems large, it is probably
not reliable. This inference is supported by the fact that al-
though the differences are large for both Nature and Neural
Computation journals, they are in opposite directions. Al-
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though I would still support the normative claim that mod-
els should be accompanied by an explicit statement of their
purpose, this support is not reinforced by the data presented
here. Many successful modelling papers do not contain such
a statement.
The third claim is that the best model purposes are those
which relate to providing explanations. Considering the pro-
portion of explanatory papers from each source, it does not
seem as if there is a strong association between better qual-
ity journals and a higher proportion of explanatory papers.
Three higher impact journals, Nature, Nature Neuroscience
and Cognitive Science do seem to have elevated levels of ex-
planatory papers, compared with the NCPW11 conference
and Connection Science. An exception to this pattern is the
Neural Computation journal, which has a very high impact
factor, but a very low proportion of papers with explanatory
purpose. The reason for this can be deduced from table 3.
Nearly all the papers in Neural Computation are demonstra-
tions of capacity.
Note, however, that for all sources the proportion of
explanatory papers is low. The mean citation counts for
explanatory compared with non-explanatory papers shows
there is no evidence that explanatory papers have higher rates
of citation. If anything, there is some evidence that non-
explanatory papers have higher rates of citation, although the
distribution of citations (as discussed above) could make the
means unrepresentative, and the results for the Neural Com-
putation journal should probably be excepted. (The differ-
ences between the type of papers published in Neural Com-
putation and the other sources in the corpus are probably due
to the fact that it is a specialist journal with an engineer-
ing slant, rather than a general scientific or cognitive science
journal like the others in the corpus).
A large minority of papers fell into the ‘integrative’ cat-
egory, something which was unanticipated from my initial
theorising, although it is in line with Kukla’s analysis of the
scope of theoretical psychology (alongside which I would
include modelling) (Kukla, 2001).
It is surprising, perhaps, that so many of this corpus of
highly cited modelling papers are of the ‘data-fitting’ cate-
gory. An influential review by Roberts and Pashler (Roberts
& Pashler, 2000) condemns data-fitting as a criterion for
model assessment.
Final words
A limitation of the current design is that the categorisation
of papers was done by one person (myself). The use of a sin-
gle reviewer means it is impossible to assess the reliability of
the categorisation. A possible extension of this work would
be to fully formalise the criteria for the categories used and
to have papers categorised and rated with respect to whether
they include an explicit statement of purpose by independent
reviewers who were blind to the source and authors of the
paper.
Nonetheless, even allowing for some minor to moderate
level of intra- and inter-reviewer variability, the major con-
clusions of this review would hold true: highly cited mod-
elling papers appear to be constructed for a wide variety of
theoretical purposes, they are often not explicit about what
their purposes are, and often these purposes are not ‘explana-
tory’ according to this scheme. Neither being explicit nor
having an explanatory purpose appear associated with higher
rates of citation. This suggests that although previously I
have suggested that these are desirable properties of a mod-
elling paper, their absence does not conspicuously hinder the
reception of a modelling paper.
The results presented here could be further investigated by
looking at modelling papers cited outside of modelling jour-
nals — in other words, by experimentalists. This would give
a valuable insight into how modelling work affects main-
stream cognitive science. Another productive avenue would
be to look how modelling papers build on and test existing
models. The cumulative nature of research programmes, and
how theories succeed or are replaced, is another area where
analysis of the nature of computational modelling could be
informed by philosophy of science (Roelofs, 2005; Lakatos,
1970; Kuhn, 1996).
The current review is an investigation of how science, at
least in this corner of the domain, is carried out, rather than
how it should be carried out. In this sense the review is in the
spirit of Feyerabend (Feyerabend, 1988) and seems to echo
his conclusion that “anything goes”. He used this phrase to
summarise his conclusion that there are no principles which
hold universally in the conduct of scientific investigations.
Here we might take it in a weaker sense to reflect the conclu-
sion that successful modelling papers are not of one type and
their nature is not captured by my initial hypothesis about
what makes a good modelling paper (i.e. explicit statement
of purpose, explanatory purpose).
A reasonable extension of this conclusion would be
that ‘naïve Popperianism’ (Magee, 1974) is demonstrably
wrong, at least in this domain of science. There is far more to
computational modelling in the cognitive sciences than pre-
diction and falsification. Although we may still hope that
there are general principles governing the desirable features
of modelling papers, this review suggests that they are not
captured by this level of analysis. General principles, if it is
possible to find and articulate them, are likely to be complex.
Like all modellers, I continue in the belief that modelling is
a powerful scientific tool. But if modelling is a tool it is clear
that it is a multipurpose tool, used by different scientists in
different ways.
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